The US Sunnyslope-case: a slippery slope for creditors? by De Leo, Frederik
The US Sunnyslope–case: a slippery 
slope for creditors? 
Valuation in cramdown procedures: creditors be damned? 
The facts of the case 
The debtor, Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership (“Sunnyslope”), developed and 
operated an apartment complex intended to provide affordable housing. When 
Sunnyslope defaulted on the senior loan for the project, the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development honored its guarantee, acquired the senior loan from the 
original private lender, and resold it to First Southern National Bank. First Southern 
started the foreclosure process, which would have wiped out affordable housing 
restrictive covenants related to additional financing. The debtor then was put into 
bankruptcy, and it exercised the cramdown option of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) and 
elected to retain the property in exchange for a new payment plan that would require 
it to pay First Southern an amount equal to the present value of the secured claim at 
the time of bankruptcy. 
Sunnyslope argued that the value of First Southern’s secured interest should be 
calculated with the affordable housing restrictions remaining in place. The 
bankruptcy court and the district court both agreed. Later on, a divided panel of 
the Ninth Circuit reversed the court’s order approving the plan of reorganization, 
holding that the court should have valued the apartment complex without regard to 
the affordable housing requirements that restricted use and, in turn, lowered 
value.  Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit granted Sunnyslope’s petition for rehearing en 
banc. 
The opinion of the court 
In this atypical case, the “going concern” use results in a lower value than a market 
foreclosure value (due to the potential for First Southern in foreclosure to invalidate 
the restrictive covenants). Consequently, the central issue on rehearing was whether 
the bankruptcy court erred by valuing the apartment complex assuming its continued 
use after reorganization as low-income housing.  Reversing the three-judge panel, the 
en banc court held that the district court did not err in applying the lower value. 
The en banc court based its opinion on the Supreme Court’s decision in Assocs. 
Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997), which stressed the instruction in § 
506(a)(1) to value the collateral based on its “proposed disposition or use” in the plan 
of reorganization. The Supreme Court in Rash emphasized that, in a reorganization 
involving a cramdown, the debtor will continue to use the collateral. A valuation must 
therefore occur in light of the “proposed repayment plan reality” and not on  a 
“hypothetical foreclosure sale”. Since the “actual use” of the property is low income-
housing and not a foreclosure sale (which is being avoided by the bankruptcy plan), 
the – value-decreasing – restrictive covenants stay in place. 
Creditors be damned? 
In a dissenting opinion, judge Kozinski, joined by judges O’Scannlain and Friedland, 
points out that the opinion of the court “fetishizes a selection of the Court’s words at 
the expense of its logic”. The court relies on a strict “particular use” interpretation of 
“replacement value”. The dissidents, however, are not found of that interpretation. 
According to them, Rash was unambiguously motivated by a desire to reduce what it 
saw as the “double risks” that cramdowns pose for creditors: “the debtor may again 
default and the property may deteriorate from extended use”. The typically higher 
secured-creditor-friendly-replacement-value standard over the typically lower 
foreclosure-value standard gives the secured creditors their due protection. 
According to the dissidents, the opinion of the court is the result of cramped 
formalism. The new valuation standard – holding the valuation hostage to the 
debtor’s “particular use” – turns entirely on the debtor’s desires; creditors be 
damned. After all, the foreclosure value is in this case greater than the replacement 
value. 
Furthermore, if we acknowledge that a cramdown procedure is a forced sale from the 
company to the creditors (T.H. JACKSON, “Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy 
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain”, Yale Law Journal 1982, (857) 893), we 
should be reluctant to let the seller dictate the price. After all, First Southern bought 
the senior loan, expecting that if the company entered financial distress, it would be 
able to start the foreclosure process, which would have wiped out the restrictive 
covenants, and in turn, increased value. If Sunnyslope wants to reorganize its 
business, it has to “buy” the claim from First Southern. It speaks for itself that First 
Southern would not have sold the claim to Sunnyslope for less than the market 
foreclosure value, since the market foreclosure value was greater than the “going 
concern” value. Indeed, in my opinion, a reorganization procedure should always 
make creditors better off. This is consistent with the ex-ante hypothetical creditors 
bargain theory (T.H. JACKSON, “Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the 
Creditors’ Bargain”, Yale Law Journal 1982, (857) 860; D. G. BAIRD en T.H. 
JACKSON, “Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy”, University of Chicago Law Review 1984, (97) 100) and the no creditor 
worse off principle which can be found in article 34(g) of the Directive 2014/59/EU of 
15 May 2014 concerning the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment banks, article 22(c) of the European Commission’s recommendation of 12 
March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency and recital 27 of 
the Proposal for Directive 2016/0359 concerning preventive restructuring 
frameworks, second change and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, 
insolvency and discharge procedures amending Directive 2012/30/EU. 
However, let us put this judgement into perspective. Firstly, reorganization 
procedures will more often than not increase the value of the company – and thus 
increase the value of creditors’ claims. Secondly, creditors such as First Southern – 
which are voluntary sophisticated creditors with a lot of bargaining power – will pass 
much of the risk on to the borrowers in the form of higher interest rates. As a result, 
these creditors will rarely be damned after all. 
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